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Transformation of resource management institutions under globalization:
the case of songgye community forests in South Korea.
David J. Yu 1,2, John M. Anderies 1,2,3, Dowon Lee 4 and Irene Perez 2
ABSTRACT. The context in which many self-governed commons systems operate will likely be significantly altered as globalization
processes play out over the next few decades. Such dramatic changes will induce some systems to fail and subsequently to be transformed,
rather than merely adapt. Despite this possibility, research on globalization-induced transformations of social-ecological systems (SESs)
is still underdeveloped. We seek to help fill this gap by exploring some patterns of transformation in SESs and the question of what
factors help explain the persistence of cooperation in the use of common-pool resources through transformative change. Through the
analysis of 89 forest commons in South Korea that experienced such transformations, we found that there are two broad types of
transformation, cooperative and noncooperative. We also found that two system-level properties, transaction costs associated group
size and network diversity, may affect the direction of transformation. SESs with smaller group sizes and higher network diversity may
better organize cooperative transformations when the existing system becomes untenable.
Key Words: collective action; community-based forest management; forest commons; multilevel governance; nested enterprise; network
diversity; robustness; robustness trade-offs; social-ecological systems; songgye; transformative capacity of social-ecological systems
INTRODUCTION
Studies of commons dilemmas have often focused on investigating
factors that affect whether and how institutions succeed or fail in
enabling collective action in social-ecological systems (SESs;
Ostrom 1990, 2005, Ostrom et al. 2002). This work has typically
been static in nature: the biophysical, social, economic, and
institutional factors that define the context in which the agents
interact are assumed fixed. Recently, scholars have begun to view
commons dilemmas through a dynamic lens, and to focus on what
factors affect the capacity of SESs to cope with change. One way
SESs cope with change is through transformation, a process that
occurs when ecological, economic, or social structures make the
existing system untenable and a fundamentally new system is
created in response (Walker et al. 2004). 
We build on the foundation described above to explore
transformation patterns of SESs. We focus on the question of
what factors help explain the persistence of effective collective
action in the management of common-pool resources in SESs
under conditions that will likely be realized in the next few decades
as a result of globalization. Specifically, scholars suggest that
globalization will connect SESs across multiple temporal and
spatial scales, dramatically changing the context in which many
self-governed common-pool resource (CPR) institutions operate
(Young et al. 2006, Anderies and Janssen 2011). One of the ways
that such global interconnectedness can impact local self-
governed CPR systems is by increasing the inflow of substitute
goods for CPRs or increasing the opportunity cost of labor, which
will reduce the salience of CPRs for local livelihoods (Poteete and
Ostrom 2004, Araral 2009). Such changes in context will likely
induce some self-governed systems to fail and subsequently
transform themselves, rather than merely adapt. In the process,
social actors will likely be confronted with dilemmas linked to the
release and reorganization of their natural capital. Some actors
may prefer the immediate benefit of selling out natural capital
and taking their share of the proceeds over the uncertain long-
term benefit of maintaining cooperation in some alternative ways.
Systematic research on the postfailure transformation process is
rare in the commons literature (although see Abel et al. 2006),
and the connection between different transformation paths and
their determinants remains poorly understood (Rudel 2011).  
In the literature, there are a number of studies that explore the
reorganization of SESs in a different light. For example, several
case studies investigate the struggles of local SESs subjected to
novel disturbances, such as increased market pressure (Wunder
et al. 2008, Silva et al. 2010), flows of people or intruders (Pérez
et al. 2011), and development (Wollenberg et al. 2006, Levang et
al. 2007). These studies focus on particular aspects of
disturbances and ensuing responses themselves, rather than on
the details of transformation. In another set of studies, scholars
exclusively analyze transformations (Olsson et al. 2004, Biggs et
al. 2010, Gelcich et al. 2010). These studies, however, either do
not involve CPRs or rely heavily on small-N cases related to very
specific contexts. A single-case study or small-N set of case studies
can have rich insights about a particular setting, but their findings
cannot easily translate into a broader theoretical analysis
(Basurto and Ostrom 2009). Finally, some studies approach the
subject from the perspective of long-term vulnerability and
transformation (Anderies 2006, Nelson et al. 2010). These studies
rely on a small-N set of archeological cases, populated with very
coarse data, and they focus on aspects of hidden vulnerabilities
that emerge when SESs optimize for a particular set of
disturbances.  
Our research complements the existing literature by examining
89 forest commons in the Geumsan region (Fig. 1) of South Korea
(Kang 2001). After persisting for hundreds of years, these self-
governed SESs all collapsed and underwent major
transformations, e.g., conservation of natural capital, conversion
to new community infrastructure, and selling out, in the second
half  of the 20th century as South Korea developed economically.
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The major drivers of this change include: (1) the transition in the
nation’s primary energy consumption from high dependence on
forest resources to near-zero dependence; (2) the massive rural-
urban migration, driven by the search for better opportunities;
and (3) the introduction of national-level forestation policies (Fig.
2). Because this set of cases constitutes a relatively large-N dataset
and provides accounts of a range of different transformations
under globalization, a careful analysis may yield some general
insights on transformative capacity of SESs.
Fig. 1. Map of Geumsan, South Korea. Light yellow area in the
magnified map indicates the terrains of flat and lower slopes
and roughly approximates the flat valleys. Green area indicates
the mountainous terrains. The letters A to J in the magnified
map indicate 10 administrative districts of Geumsan.
In this paper, we tackle three research questions. First, what are
the patterns of transformation undergone by the 89 self-governed
systems? Unlike what is indicated by the dichotomous
classification of SESs as either robust or collapsed (Anderies et
al. 2004), transformations can involve multiple trajectories of
change. Second, what are some of the key factors that influence
the persistence of effective collective action in the management
of shared resources as systems undergo transformative change?
We focus on the less-investigated effects of system-level structures,
e.g., network diversity and transaction costs, rather than on the
details of community interactions that are often emphasized in
small-N case studies. Third, are there trade-offs between
optimizing to particular past conditions and transformative
capacity (sensu Janssen et al. 2007)? Here, we investigate whether
self-governed SESs that may have become robust to particular
past conditions undergo less cooperative transformations when
they face new challenges in this era of globalization.
METHODS
The study system
The Geumsan region sits in the central inland area of South Korea
and encompasses 576 km². The landscape of the region is roughly
characterized by a large central flat valley and surrounding
mountain ranges with forests (Fig. 1). Hundreds of villages are
interspersed throughout the area. Songgye (pronounced "song-
geh") are traditional Korean forest organizations, established for
setting up community-owned mountainous forests to provide
access to firewood and organic compost made from weedy plants
growing inside forests (Kang 2001, Chun and Tak 2009). Many
songgye operated in the Geumsan region for hundreds of years
and played key roles for the sustainable management of forest
commons, until they became functionally obsolete in the mid-20th
century (Kang 2001). Until the advent of fossil fuels and
commercial fertilizers, the lives of most commoners heavily
depended on sourcing these forest resources (Kang 2001, Chun
and Tak 2009). 
The main role of a songgye as a resource management
organization was to provide three important types of public
infrastructure. First, songgye provided institutions in the form of
appropriation rules. For example, cutting down trees for firewood
was usually prohibited, and members could only collect
brushwood or dead trees during specified time periods a few times
a year (Park 2000, Chun and Tak 2009). Second, songgye enabled
communities to tackle challenges of infrastructure provision.
Through songgye, a village as a whole could pool money to
purchase a mountainous forest as common property (Kang 2001).
Villagers also cooperated through songgye to repair mountain
trails, essential infrastructure for enabling the mobility of resource
appropriators (Kang 2001). Third, songgye facilitated monitoring
of rule compliance and sanctioning of unauthorized activities.
Some songgye had dedicated guards, while others had staff  or
ordinary members playing dual roles for guarding against
intruders or rule-breakers (Kang 2001, Chun 2003).
The drivers and consequences of change
With the onset of industrialization in South Korea from the 1960s
and 1970s, dramatic changes in context were imposed on the
songgye of Geumsan. The nation’s total demand for forest
resources underwent a transition, starting from this period. Prior
to industrialization, most South Koreans lived in rural areas and
depended heavily on forest resources for home energy. For
example, roughly 73% of the nation’s annual primary energy
consumption came from firewood during 1955 to 1960 (Fig. 2a;
KCC 2001) and rural populations made up approximately 58%
(14.6 million) of the 25 million people in 1960 (Bae and Lee 2006).
However, in the 1960s and 1970s, the use of coal briquettes began
to spread widely across the country for residential uses, even in
rural areas, and substitute for firewood, and the use of foreign
imported oil skyrocketed from the 1970s on (KESIS 2013). The
use of firewood dropped dramatically (Fig. 2a) and by 1981 to
1990, only 3% of the annual primary energy consumption came
from firewood. South Korea also underwent a massive rural-to-
urban migration from the late 1960s on, driven by the search for
better economic opportunities in urban areas (Figs. 2b and 2c).
By 1992, rural population had declined to approximately 13% (5.7
million) of the total population (43.7 million, BOK 2013). Driven
in part by these trends, South Korea witnessed a striking
turnaround in the nation’s overall forest cover, from net
deforestation to net reforestation (Fig. 2b). The nation’s average
use of commercial fertilizers also increased substantially during
this period, from 162 kg/ha in 1970 to 458 kg/ha in 1990 (MAF
2005).  
The use of coal briquettes and commercial fertilizers gained wide
adoption in the 1960s and 1970s, and some of the more remote
villages were deserted by the 1990s, which also affected Geumsan
(Kang 2001). The overall forest cover of the area also increased
tremendously, jumping by a factor of 13.4 between 1976 and 2010
(Table A.1 in Appendix 1). These drastic changes in context most
likely rendered the songgye in Geumsan obsolete from the early
Ecology and Society 19(2): 2
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss2/art2/
Fig. 2. Changes in the broader context. A) Trends in average primary energy consumption and volume of
growing stock from 1955 to 2003 (Source: KCC 2001, KESIS 2013). Other energy sources include coal, oil, gas,
nuclear power, and hydro-power (TOE: tons of oil equivalent). B) Trends in rural population and volume of
growing stock from 1934 to 2009 (Source: Bae and Lee 2006, BOK 2013, KFS 2010). The lines between the
markers are linear interpolations. Note that the data before 1952 concerns the entire Korean Peninsula. C)
Trends in earned income of urban household and farming income of rural household from 1970 to 2004
(Source: MAF 2005).
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1960s, because of the tempered economic salience of the key forest
resources that songgye were designed to govern (Kang 2001). In
fact, no sightings of active songgye operations have been reported
in the region since the 1960s (Kang 2001). After their collapse,
the songgye in the region reorganized themselves in a number of
different ways. The nature of their reorganization is the focus of
this paper. 
At the same time, a number of shifting sociopolitical trends also
affected the decisions of local villagers as they weighed different
options for reorganizing their songgye (Kang 2001). Beginning
in the 1960s, the Korean government introduced a series of
regional and national forestation plans to revitalize forests that
were denuded by the Korean War and past overharvesting (Chun
and Tak 2009, Bae et al. 2012). Rural villages were encouraged to
organize tree-planting initiatives and to curb timber logging or
other types of harvesting activities, such as slash-and-burn
farming. The government also rolled out concerted public
campaigns to change the mental models of rural villagers. Slogans
such as “Planting is loving the nation” (Lee and Lee 2005) and
“Cutting trees is a menace and planting trees is an act of
patriotism” (Bae et al. 2012) were directed at the general public. 
In some cases, legal disputes arose over unclear property rights
regarding songgye forests. These disputes originated from a
colonial-period forest policy introduced to restructure the
traditional forest ownership and tenure system during the
Japanese occupation period (1910-1945). Under this policy,
songgye mountains were denied registration as commons. As
such, many songgye in Geumsan had to register their forests as
private properties under the names of village leaders (Kang 2001).
This made the forests privately owned de jure but de facto
commons. Finally, a real-estate boom pervaded the region
throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Kang 2001). As a side effect of
economic development, the value of songgye forests as a real-
estate commodity increased significantly around this time, and
the benefits that could be extracted from forestry became further
obscured (Kang 2001). This shifting valuation most likely
influenced the decisions of local villagers during the
transformation of their songgye.
Data sources
We conducted secondary analysis of the existing data that had
been collected for a previous research project on songgye (Kang
2001). Published and endorsed by the Geumsan Cultural Center,
Kang (2001) is the only large-N qualitative study done to uncover
historical evidence of songgye operation at the study site. FAO
2005 provides a similar historical case study about songgye in the
Anmyoen-do region of South Korea. More important for our
purposes, Kang’s study records how some of these songgye have
reorganized themselves in the last 50 years. The 156 cases that are
described by Kang (2001) offer a rare opportunity to explore
general questions regarding the transformative capacity of SESs
subjected to relatively rapid change associated with globalization. 
For the data collection, Kang (2001) primarily relied on oral
histories, interviews with key informants, and archival research.
The use of such qualitative methods of data collection are
common in historical case studies of collective action related to
natural resources (Poteete et al. 2010). Kang’s (2001) interview
data came from 391 elderly local villagers who were identified to
have some knowledge on the past practices of songgye as well as
of past village-level decisions related to the use of songgye forests.
Of the 391 informants, 388 were men, most of whom were likely
heads of their households. The average age of the informants was
73.9 years. The documentary evidence came from the archival
materials that included contracts of property rights and
transactions involving songgye forests, legal documents settling
disputes, and writings of constitutions of songgye. Kang
conducted the research over 10 years from the early 1990s to 2001,
during which he visited the site 80 times for fieldwork. Most of
the interviews (98%) were conducted between 1998 and 2001. 
For the secondary analysis, we subsampled 89 cases based on two
conditions: time coincidence of transformation events with the
onset of economic development (around 1960) and presence of
key variables, e.g., outcome of transformation and size of resource
system. The first condition ensured that we were investigating
transformative capacity under the influence of globalization. We
thus restricted our analysis to the events that occurred in the
period between 1960 and 1999. In the sample, 85 out of the 89
transformations occurred between the 1960s and 1980s. Note that
we did not further group these 89 cases, even though different
drivers of change may have been more important in different
times. Our aim was to understand transformative capacity in
relation to the general resilience of SESs under the broader
influence of globalization, not their specific resilience or
robustness in regard to specific disturbances (Folke et al. 2010).
A word of caution about sampling bias is in order here. Because
of the sampling criteria above, we were actually sampling the cases
of more persistent songgye rather than all representative ones.
Hence, any causal claims made here should be interpreted in
relative terms, in the se0nse of the bias created here.
Method and scope of analysis
Growing theoretical literature on collective action posits that a
large number of contextual factors potentially affect the
likelihood of individuals to solve collective action problems
(Agrawal 2002, Poteete et al. 2010). To identify relevant contextual
factors and to compare user interactions and outcomes across the
sample, we employed the ontological framework of SESs (Ostrom
2007; Ostrom 2009). Using the framework, we identified relevant
similarities and differences in contextual factors and type of
transformation among the sampled cases. Then we searched for
plausible models for the relationship between type of
transformation and contextual factors. Our approach reflects the
methodological challenge raised by Basurto and Ostrom (2009),
who assert that scholars should look for similarities and
differences from rich details across multiple cases and combine
theories to generate new hypotheses.  
In our analysis, we focused on the roles of system-level factors,
such as network diversity and biophysical context, rather than on
the details of community interactions that are often emphasized
in small-N case studies. Our focus on system-level factors is
motivated by recognizing that SESs are complex adaptive systems
(Levin and Clark 2010) in which emergent, system-level properties
interact with individual-level processes to generate system
dynamics. Of course, attributes of the community such as age and
gender structure, existence of a local leader, and discussion during
village meetings may affect the level of participation in
community forest management (Lise 2000, Maskey et al. 2006).
Thus, attributes of individual agents interact with biophysical
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context and rules-in-use in complex ways to produce governance
outcomes (Ostrom 2005). Our aim was to complement these
earlier studies on attributes of the community and rules-in-use by
exploring the effects of the system-level or structural factors on
which these community details play out. Much work remains to
be done to understand the effects of these system-level factors in
the context of social-ecological transformation (Folke et al. 2010).
We also note that the details of the influences on the villagers’
decision making of gender and age structure and community
interactions during village meetings were unavailable in Kang’s
(2001) data. We suffer from the general limitation of all SES
research: very few, if  any, case studies exist that incorporate
variables relating to all the components of SESs articulated in the
SES Framework (Ostrom 2009) or the Robustness Framework
(Anderies et al. 2004). As a result, we must use the data we have
to study particular subsets of relationships within those
frameworks.
PATTERNS OF TRANSFORMATION
By the early 1960s, all songgye in Geumsan had become
dysfunctional. In the ensuing postfailure reorganization phases,
villagers interacted in the arena of village assembly meetings to
decide the fate of their now-obsolete forests. The village assembly,
an overarching village organization that oversaw all types of
coordinated tasks in a single village, existed for every village in
the region (Kang 2001). Depending on the number of
participating villages in a songgye, either a single village or
multiple villages interacted in the decision-making process. All
member households of a village assembly could voice their
opinions and, if  voting was necessary for the decision making,
could cast a vote. In general, two broad types of actions were
possible: actions favoring short-term self-interest and actions
maintaining cooperative management in alternative ways. A
village consensus, meaning unanimous or almost unanimous
agreement, or voting, some sort of majority rule, was generally
used for decision making at the village level, and the decision
reached was binding for all members. When multiple villages were
involved, decisions were usually made through two stages: each
village would first decide on its preference and then all involved
villages would have to agree unanimously if  their shared assets
were to be liquidated for other purposes (Kang 2001).  
In the data, we observed four patterns of transformations. In
pattern A, villages chose to maintain cooperative governance
regimes and conserved their forests intact. In such cases, resource
systems that had provided direct-use values were essentially
transformed into public goods with intrinsic values. In pattern B,
villages sold some or all of their forest resource systems and used
the revenue raised to establish alternative community
infrastructures. Examples include building village roads and
bridges, purchasing lands for communal farming, constructing
schools and community centers, and establishing communal
funds (Kang 2001). In essence, these villages maintained their
cooperative governance regimes in novel ways by converting their
natural capital into new types of infrastructure that better met
the modern-day needs of their communities. Pattern C was
characterized by the release of some or all of the relevant natural
capital with nothing contributed back to collective welfare.
Motivated by short-term self-interest, villages in these instances
sold their natural capital and simply divided the proceeds from
the sale among village households. In pattern D, we observed
instances of property rights disputes motivated by unclear land
titles. Despite the possibility of settling the conflict and preserving
their communal forests, villagers in these instances failed to
generate enough collective action to initiate formal legal actions,
namely, collecting fees for upfront legal charges. In such cases,
resource systems fell into the hands of a few opportunistic
stakeholders (Kang 2001). 
For our purposes, we further compacted the four observed
patterns into two broader patterns, based on the degree of
persistence of cooperation: cooperative transformation and
noncooperative transformation. In the cooperative transformations,
the common-pool resources provided by the forest were
transformed into public goods, and cooperative governance was
maintained in alternative forms (patterns A and B). In the
noncooperative transformations, all of the forest resources were
transformed into private gains, and cooperative governance was
discontinued (patterns C and D). This binary categorization
constitutes our dependent variable in the statistical analysis. Our
goal was to test whether there is a significant relationship between
these patterns of transformation and the structure of SESs.
CONTEXT OF TRANSFORMATION
Some contextual factors were judged to be important for affecting
the patterns of transformation. These factors constitute the
explanatory variables in our statistical analysis.
Social connectedness
A web of village-level social connectedness developed in
Geumsan as many villages adopted multilevel structures for the
implementation of their songgye governance regimes prior to the
20th century. Built on horizontal and vertical social linkages,
multilevel governance is defined as having multiple centers or
authorities of management and arrangements in which collective
action is organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises
(Ostrom 1990, Cox et al. 2010). 
In Geumsan, three historical strategies played key roles for the
development of songgye-related social connectedness: multiple-
village cooperation, diversity and redundancy in cooperative
networks, and vertical nesting within village assemblies. Multiple-
village cooperation occurred whenever two or more villages
formed an allied songgye by copurchasing a resource system and
performing joint appropriation and provision activities under the
supervision of a loosely formed intervillage council (Kang 2001;
see Figs. 3b and 3d). This practice reflects the design principle of
nested enterprises in governing the commons (Ostrom 1990). We
speculated that the resulting economy of scale and modularity of
social systems better facilitated the provision of threshold public
goods such as purchasing a large-scale mountainous forest and
repairing mountain trails. For example, for purchasing forests,
multiple villages acted together to increase their total group size,
and they delegated each village to pool financial contributions
from its member households. In this way, these allied villages were
able to increase the level of the public good provision while
decreasing the size of individual contributions and coordination
costs. For the same reason, member villages of an allied songgye
usually divided and maintained different sections of a network
of trails (Kang 2001). In the cases where multiple-village
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Fig. 3. Types of village-to-songgye social connectedness. The link between a village and a forest represents a
share in the property right of the forest and a participation in joint appropriation and provision activities.
Triangles represent the biophysical boundary of the forest which is determined naturally by the physical
boundary of a mountain along a contiguous range of mountains. The dashed rectangles indicate the
institutional boundary of the songgye.
cooperation did not occur, a single village managed a
mountainous forest by itself  (see Figs. 3a and 3c).  
Diversity in cooperative networks arose whenever villages
participated in multiple instances of songgye simultaneously,
which resulted in the creation of cross-institutional links across
different songgye (Figs. 3c and 3d). The resulting links of a village
probably enabled that village to cope with varying biophysical
conditions and uncertainties because of redundant flows of forest
resources as well as to gain access to institutional diversity (for
theoretical insights, see Elmqvist et al. 2003, Folke et al. 2005,
Anderies and Janssen 2011). For example, some villages with
existing songgye forests that were either unproductive or too
distant from their village locations chose to join another songgye
to access more productive or nearer forests (Kang 2001).  
Vertical nesting occurred whenever songgye-related affairs in a
single village were nested under that village’s assembly (Fig. 4).
Entire cases of songgye in Geumsan practiced vertical nesting
(Kang 2001). We speculated that, through vertical nesting, a
songgye could economize transaction costs by tapping into
established leadership and legitimacy that already existed with
village assembly. An additional layer of nesting occurred for allied
songgye, because they were coordinated by intervillage councils
(Fig. 4b).
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Fig. 4. Types of vertical linkages in songgye social structure.
Village location
Depending on where villages are located, we speculated that the
villages faced two biosocial heterogeneities in the past: variation
in availability of forest resources in the villages’ immediate
surroundings and variation in degree of village-to-village social
connectivity.  
Most of the villages in the central districts (districts E and H in
Fig. 1) are located in flat areas, and therefore lacked access to
forests in their immediate surroundings. In the perimeter districts
of B, C, F, I, and J, we observed multiple types of landscapes.
Here, clusters of flat areas and mountainous terrains coexist in
closer proximity. Kang (2001) suggests that the flat areas in the
central and perimeter districts were the more populous areas,
where villages tended to link seamlessly to one another without
major spatial barriers. Most of the villages here probably had
more neighboring villages and better intervillage social
connectivity than those in more mountainous areas, but had less
ease in finding harvestable forests nearby (Kang 2001). In
contrast, most of the villages located in the mountainous areas
(districts A, D, and G and parts of districts B, C, F, I, and J) tend
to be isolated spatially by the natural barriers of mountain ranges.
Intervillage social connectivity was probably lower there in the
past as well, but these villages had better access to mountainous
forests (Kang 2001).
Resource systems and units
Mountainous forests varied among songgye in terms of size and
terrain characteristics. Some forests were large in area,
encompassing as much as few hundred hectares. Some forests also
differed in resource potential, having mostly rocky or gently
sloping terrains. Regarding resource units, harvested items were
mainly firewood and organic materials for composts. Some
songgye, however, were different in that they historically exercised
considerable dry-field farming inside their mountain regions as
well and also allowed tenants to take over the farming in exchange
for annual tenant fees (Kang 2001). In such cases, the collected
fees became an important source of income for covering
miscellaneous operating expenses of the songgye. 
As for the forest conditions in terms of volume of growing stock
and composition of tree species, there may have been some
variation across songgye forests between 1960 and 1999. However,
such data is unavailable for our study, and the decisions of
villagers were probably negligibly affected by these conditions.
This is due to the fact, as can be deduced from Figure 2 and Table
A.1, that the dominant trend was the declining user dependence
on forest resources and the rise in forest cover, regardless of the
decisions selected by songgye users.
Summary: similarities and differences
We outline here some key similarities and differences (explanatory
variables) across the cases for the period between the 1960s and
1990s. The notable similarities are reduced economic salience of
CPRs due to emergence of substitute goods, rapid economic
development, exposure to a real-estate boom and reforestation
policy by the government, unclear property rights, history of use,
similar socioeconomic attributes of users, and decision-making
through village assembly meetings. The key differences across the
cases are outcome of transformation; number of villages, i.e.,
number of horizontally linked villages under a songgye; ratio of
cross-institutional links; spatial extent of villages; topographic
location of villages; size of resource system; terrain of resource
system; and existence of tenant fees for dry-field farming.  
Note that most of the similarities relate to the major drivers of
change that were general and pervasive in nature. Because the
songgye under study all derive from a single rural region that is
monoethnic and monocultural in user characteristics, it is
reasonable to assume that most of the songgye experienced the
same level of shifting trends. Therefore, from a system-level
perspective, notable differences across the cases mostly concerned
the specifics of social connectedness and variations in villages’
locations, topographic positions, resource systems, and units.
Although the listed similarities and differences are not exhaustive,
they largely cover the relevant information thought to be
important for this research (see, e.g., Fleischman et al. 2010). Table
1 describes the variable definitions and measurements.
DATA ANALYSIS
To relate the likelihood of cooperative transformation to the
contextual factors, we used multivariate logistic-regression
models. We used a model-selection approach to hypothesis testing
(Johnson and Omland 2004). We applied the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) method (see Appendix 1 for details) to compare
the fits of all possible combinations of explanatory variables
(Burnham and Anderson 2002). AIC is calculated for a suite of
models. The absolute size of the AIC is unimportant; instead the
difference in AIC values between models indicates the relative
support for the models. To compare models, we calculated Akaike
weights (Burnham and Anderson 2002). We considered as
plausible models those with Akaike weights that were within 10%
of the highest weight. We also reported the relative importance
of the explanatory variables as the sum of Akaike weights over
all models. The relative variable importance is the probability that,
of the variables considered, a certain variable is in the best-
approximating model. 
Finally, we studied correlations between topographic location of
villages and their songgye-related social connectedness. If  social
connectedness is associated with topographic location and also
with different trajectories of transformation, we could infer that
optimizing for robustness (i.e., forming social connectedness) to
past conditions (i.e., variations in resource flow stemming from
topographic location) possibly affected the transformative
capacity of songgye in the present day.
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Table 1. Variable descriptions.
 Variables Definitions
Dependent variable:
Outcome of transformation The outcome of transformation is categorized into two broad types: (1) cooperative transformation and
(2) noncooperative transformation ( = 1 if  cooperative; = 0 if  noncooperative).
 
Independent variables:
Number of villages A number of villages in a songgye that are horizontally linked through shared property rights of a
resource system and joint appropriation and provision activities. For songgye A in Fig. 3a and c, this
measure is 1. In Fig. 3b and d, this measure is 3.
Ratio of cross-institutional links The ratio of cross-institutional links measures the percentage of participating villages in a songgye that
participate in multiple instances of songgye simultaneously.† For songgye A in Fig. 3a and b, this measure
is 0. In Fig. 3c, this is 100%. In Fig. 3d, this is 2/3 or 67%.
Spatial extent of villages The spatial extent is measured by the scale of administrative districts spanned by participating villages (=
0 if  one village is involved; = 1 if  multiple villages are involved, but all are situated within one subdistrict;
and = 2 if  multiple villages are involved and are situated over multiple subdistricts).
Topographic location of villages The percentages of flat areas in the surrounding areas of participating villages are averaged to derive this
measure.‡
Size of resource system The size of resource system measures the physical area covered by a songgye’s mountainous forests (= 0 if
1 - 10 hectares; = 1 if  11 - 100 hectares; and = 2 if  greater than 100 hectares).§
Terrain of resource system The terrain type is estimated from the existence of considerable dry-field farming inside songgye
mountains (= 1 if  considerable dry-field farming exists, i.e., presence of large mildly sloping terrain; = 0
otherwise).
Existence of tenant fees The functional diversity carried by the resource system is measured by the existence of annual tenant fees
levied for the rights to exercise dry-field farming inside songgye mountains. It gauges whether or not the
villages were able to extract extra benefits from their mountains (= 1 if  annual tenant fees were
collected; = 0 otherwise).
† Because these links in a given songgye can adjust over time as associated songgye undergo transformations, we take a snapshot of these links
(taken at 1960) as our basis of analysis.
‡ The topographic position index (TPI; Weiss 2001) was derived for each subdistrict that contains member villages. For each subdistrict, flat areas
and lower slopes are divided by the total subdistrict area. This percentage was then averaged over all involved subdistricts.
§ The physical size is ordinal because some of the empirical cases provided estimated ranges of area instead of exact figures.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
The majority (73%) of the transformations were cooperative: 36
cases (40%) of pattern A, conservation of community forests, and
29 cases (33%) of pattern B, conversion to alternative community
infrastructures. The remaining transformations were noncooperative:
19 cases (21%) of pattern C, selling out, and 5 cases (6%) of pattern
D, legal disputes over property rights. The notable trends in
descriptive statistics were the contrasts in the averages of the
number of villages involved and ratios of cross-institutional links
(Tables 2 and 3). The average of the number of villages involved
in the cooperative transformations was lower (2.2) than its
counterpart (6.3) in noncooperative transformations (Table 3).
The average of cross-institutional links among the cooperative
cases was higher (0.6) than it was among the noncooperative cases
(0.3).
Model selection
Model selection results suggested that 20 models could be
considered as plausible (Table 4). Given the data and set of
candidate models, the best explanatory model is the one that
included “number of villages” and “ratio of cross-institutional
links.” “Number of villages” was included in all of the plausible
models with a negative response. “Number of villages” had a
probability of 0.87 of being in the best-approximating model with
a positive response. Thus, cooperative outcomes were associated
with lower number of villages and a higher proportion of cross-
linked villages. “Existence of tenant fees” had a probability close
to 0.5 of being in the best model, and with the previous two
variables formed the second plausible model. The association of
outcomes with “existence of tenant fees” was negative. The third
model added “terrain of resource systems” to the best model. This
variable had a probability of 0.31 with a negative coefficient. The
fourth model added “topographic location of villages” to the best
model. This variable had a probability of 0.32 of being in the best-
fitting model, and its response was negative. “Size of resource
system” was added in the fifth plausible model. This variable had
a probability of 0.31 with a positive coefficient. Finally, the
“spatial extent of villages” first appears in the seventeenth
plausible model. This variable had a low probability (0.14) of
being in the best-fitting model with a positive coefficient.
Association between social connectedness and biophysical context
We ran correlation analyses to test whether the biophysical
context (topographic location) of a village was associated with its
social connectedness. We first tested the association between the
topographic location of a village and the group size of each
songgye, the number of villages that the village belonged to. A
topographic position index, or TPI (Weiss 2001), was derived for
each subdistrict that contained member villages. For each
subdistrict, areas of flat and lower slopes were divided by the total
subdistrict area to derive the percentage of flat terrains. For the
group size, our unit of analysis was associations between a village
and its participations in one or more songgye. Because we are
dealing with past robustness, we applied all 156 cases of songgye
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Table 2. Categorical variable statistics by cooperative and noncooperative transformations. For details, see Table 1. 
Variables  Noncooperative transformation 
(N = 24) 
 Cooperative transformation 
(N = 65) 
 Frequency (%)  Frequency (%) 
 (= 0) (= 1) (= 2)  (= 0) (= 1) (= 2) 
Size of resource system 5 (21%) 13 (54%) 6 (25%)  19 (29%) 36 (55%) 10 (15%) 
Terrain of resource system 13 (54%) 11 (46%)   44 (68%) 21 (32%)  
Existence of tenant fees 6 (25%) 18 (75%)   25 (38%) 40 (62%)  




Table 3. Continuous variable statistics by cooperative and noncooperative transformations. For details, see Table 1. 
Variables  Noncooperative transformation  Cooperative transformation 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min, Max  Mean Std. Dev. Min, Max 
Number of member villages 6.330 9.020 0.39  2.185 2.567 1.16 
Ratio of cross-institutional links 0.344 0.423 0.1  0.561 0.486 0.1 




Table 4. Plausible models identified by the AIC method. For each model, the table indicates the coefficient of the variables included, the 
number of parameters (df), log-likelihood (logLik), delta weight (∆AIC, difference between the AIC for a given model and the AIC of 
the best-fitting model), and Akaike weights (w, the model selection probability). Averaged coefficients and the relative variable 
importance are also presented. The Akaike weight is the probability that a model would be selected as the best-fitting model if the data 
were collected again under identical circumstances. Model averaged estimates are weighted by their Akaike weight. 






















logLik ∆AIC w 
1 3 1.1059 - - - -1.0601 0.6322 - - -44.09 94.19 0.12 
2 4 1.1254 - - - -1.1117 0.6114 - - -43.24 94.47 0.10 
3 4 1.1091 - -0.3664 - -1.0242 0.6667 -0.2176 - -43.78 95.55 0.06 
4 4 1.1163 - - -0.2259 -0.9973 0.7214 - - -43.85 95.70 0.06 
5 6 0.9612 - -0.4227 - -1.5737 0.6889 - -0.0923 -41.88 95.75 0.05 
6 5 1.1409 - -0.3863 -0.2598 -1.0257 0.7069 - - -42.91 95.82 0.05 
7 5 0.8885 - - - -1.4457 0.7125 - 0.0064 -42.93 95.85 0.05 
8 5 1.1254 - -0.3348 - -1.0959 0.6264 -0.0710 - -43.21 96.42 0.04 
9 6 0.8829 - - - -1.4584 0.7606 -0.2790 -0.0081 -42.43 96.86 0.03 
10 5 1.1238 - - -0.2585 -0.9443 0.7760 -0.2464 - -43.46 96.91 0.03 
11 7 0.9199 - -0.4429 -0.2941 -1.5067 0.8027 - -0.0218 -41.48 96.96 0.03 
12 6 0.8402 - - -0.2638 -1.3957 0.8240 - 0.08224 -42.61 97.22 0.03 
13 3 1.0528 - -0.4015 - -0.9802 - - - -45.70 97.40 0.02 
14 2 1.0207 - - - -0.9109 - - - -46.78 97.56 0.02 
15 7 0.9530 - -0.3676 - -1.5649 0.7160 -0.1257 -0.0908 -41.79 97.59 0.02 
16 6 1.1420 - -0.3444 -0.2674 -1.0029 0.7315 -0.0942 - -42.87 97.73 0.02 
17 5 0.9564 1.0000 - - -1.2842 0.5691 - - -43.92 97.83 0.02 
18 7 0.8127 - - -0.3069 -1.4014 0.9021 -0.3128 0.1034 -42.00 98.00 0.02 
19 6 0.9913 1.0000 -0.3573 - -1.3017 0.5583 - - -43.11 98.22 0.02 
20 8 0.8989 - -0.3745 -0.3068 -1.4952 0.8450 -0.1518 -0.0017 -41.36 98.73 0.01 
Averaged coefficients 1.0230 0.0046 -0.1788 -0.0802 -1.2054 0.6007 -0.0536 -0.0110    
Relative variable importance 1.00 0.14 0.46 0.32 1.00 0.87 0.31 0.31    
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as the sample. Because some villages joined more than one
songgye, the total count of associations was 501, although the
total number of villages was 338. The association was significant
(p < 0.001) with a modest correlation (Pearson’s r = 0.365). This
suggests that villages situated in a flat valley were more likely to
be a member of an allied songgye than villages located in
mountainous areas. This make intuitive sense: with more
neighbors and less resource availability in its immediate
surroundings, a village located in a valley probably had more
incentives to cooperate with others to economize costs of
operating a songgye. The association between the topographic
location and whether a village carried at least one cross-
institutional link is not significant (p > 0.05).
DISCUSSION
Our research began with the assertion that, given the process of
globalization now underway, the study of the commons needs to
not only address whether cooperation arises or fails in a given set
of biophysical, social, and economic circumstances, but also to
begin to understand the dynamics of cooperation as those
circumstances change. Here we focus on some dimensions of
postfailure processes and the question of what factors help
explain the nature of the postfailure transformation of self-
governed CPR systems. In the current body of literature, we found
no studies that directly attempted to answer this question in a
structured way. Most of the studies either focused on relationships
among aspects of specific disturbances, responses, and
vulnerability trade-offs or depended on either a single case or a
small-N set of cases, which could not offer understanding of the
underlying structure for observed patterns of transformation in
a statistically significant way.  
From analyzing 89 songgye in Geumsan that underwent
transformations under globalization, we found that the
transformations were either cooperative or noncooperative. The
majority of the observed transformations were cooperative (65
out of 89). The presence of these two broader trajectories of
transformation simply reflects the nature of a dilemma faced by
the users: whether to continue to pursue some social welfare, as
they had previously, or to opt for private gains. The fact that the
majority of the observed transformations were cooperative may
be explained by the sampling bias we introduced by selecting only
those songgye that remained intact until the early 1960s, which
implies that our sample probably consisted of villages that were
inherently high in social capital. Such higher levels of social
capital probably enabled many villages to pursue some form of
collective welfare in spite of the apparent temptation to pursue
individual gains during transformations. 
The best-fitting model shows that cooperative transformations
are negatively correlated with the number of villages in a songgye.
On the other hand, cooperative transformations are positively
associated with the ratio of cross-institutional links. The opposite
is true for noncooperative transformations. The direction of
association exhibited by the number of villages in a songgye is
consistent with the transaction cost hypothesis of group size: the
more participants there are in a collective action problem, the
more difficult it is to organize collective action, because of higher
coordination or transaction costs (Poteete and Ostrom 2004,
Araral 2009). Because participant villages in a songgye act
cohesively as single actors at the system level, the number of
member villages is a scale-invariant representation of group size.
As such, songgye with higher counts of member villages probably
faced greater transaction costs and thus were less likely to
maintain collective action through transformations. This
speculation is consistent with the observed patterns in our sample
data. One might ask then why such songgye with large group sizes
even existed in the first place. In the past, their emergence was
probably possible or was even welcomed, because the salience of
forest resources for villager livelihoods was high and the necessary
public infrastructure, e.g., mountain trails, were threshold public
goods that required economy of scale in contributions of human
effort. 
What we find more interesting is the positive association between
the ratio of cross-institutional links and the prospect of villages
engaging in more cooperative transformations. Such links
emerged when the villages in Geumsan participate in multiple
instances of songgye simultaneously. We speculate that these
villages with cross-institutional links may have functioned as
bridging actors or connectors who facilitated information
exchanges and brought in networks of contacts that helped local
communities to gain access to new ideas and resources as well as
institutional diversity (Westley 1995, Folke et al. 2005). In the
past, these villages probably fostered circulation of more diverse
and up-to-date knowledge, useful for governing forest commons
sustainably. Similarly, in the modern-day situations of
transformation driven by globalization, the presence of such
connectors probably mitigated the problem of information
uncertainties regarding available trajectories of transformation
and the associated costs and benefits. For example, the presence
of bridging villages may have better facilitated circulation of
information regarding the serviceability of new community
infrastructure that villagers were not aware of, what the social
value of a conservation infrastructure or alternative public
infrastructure could be, or what the expected market value of a
forest might have been if  sold. 
We found some evidence that there was a potential trade-off
between robustness and transformative capacity of songgye. Our
analysis showed that the topographic location of a village and the
number of its horizontal links are significantly associated. Given
that this connectedness resembles multilevel governance
structures, which are known to enhance adaptive capacity and
thus robustness of social systems (Ostrom 1996, Folke et al. 2005,
Marshall 2008), we could infer the following: such connectedness
evolved in Geumsan in part because of the villages’ efforts to
ensure a robust supply of key resources, firewood and organic
materials for composts, despite variations in biophysical
conditions. In the past, the emergence of such context-dependent
connectedness probably gave those songgye more robustness to
the uncertainty of resource flows. For example, from the
horizontal links, such songgye probably had more local
adaptability and economy of scale for providing collective goods.
However, when pressures associated with globalization finally
necessitated transformations, the advantages of horizontal links
no longer applied and the transaction costs associated with
horizontal links may have dominated the transformation action
situation.  
Finally, we reflect on the effects of the remaining independent
variables. Although these variables were absent in the best-fitting
model, we can make the following assessments. The negative
associations of the cooperative outcomes with “existence of
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tenant fees,” “terrain of resource system,” and “topographic
location of villages” may imply that when these variables have
larger values, the forests probably have more favorable terrains
and locations and thus more potential for alternative uses. This
could mean higher opportunity costs for transforming
cooperatively. Contrary to our expectation, “existence of tenant
fees” is negatively associated with cooperative outcomes. A
possible explanation is that slash-and-burn farming was strongly
curbed by the national-level forestation policies from the early
1970s, meaning no more revenue from tenants (Bae and Lee 2006).
The positive associations of cooperative outcomes with “size of
resource system” and “spatial extent of villages” may be explained
by the observation that some songgye with large-scale resource
systems that were spread over multiple subdistricts chose to
informally subdivide their forests among their member villages
(Kang 2001). This informal subdivision of shared property rights
could have given those member villages more incentives for
transforming cooperatively.
CONCLUSION
From the above analysis, we may draw some conclusions about
the transformative capacity of SESs subjected to the growing
extent and intensity of global interconnectedness. When self-
governed common-pool resource systems become untenable as a
result of globalization, those systems with lower transaction costs,
i.e., smaller group size, and higher network diversity, i.e., more
ties to others through linkages such as cross-linked property rights
or shared institutional memory, are more likely to organize
transformations that still preserve some form of collective welfare.
Conversely, previously highly efficient systems that relied on
economy of scale and undivided participation from multiple
social systems through nested enterprise may become more
vulnerable to transforming uncooperatively when they become
untenable. The present paper is limited in scope. Further studies
in other contexts may find different empirical patterns and
different variables to be more important. The accumulation of
different insights from different contexts and their comparisons,
including ours, will only lead to a fuller understanding of the
transformative capacity of SESs.
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Appendix 1. Forest growth in Geumsan from 1976 to 2010. 
 
The overall forest cover of Geumsan, South Korea increased by a factor of 13.4 between 1976 and 2010. 
 


















We studied the factors determining cooperative transformation by means of multivariate logistic-
regression models. Contextual factors included two factors (spatial extent of villages and size of the 
resource system), four continuous variables (number of villages, existence of tenant fees, ratio of cross-
institutional links, and topographic location of villages), and one dichotomous variable (terrain of 
resource system). Our dependent variables (type of transformation) is dichotomous (1 if cooperative 
transformation and 0 if non-cooperative transformation). See Table A.2 for the values given to each 
variable. 
 
Table A.2. Values of independent variables. 
Variables Values 
Existence of tenant fees 1: annual tenant fees were collected 
0: otherwise 
Number of villages Continuous. Range: 1-39 
Ratio of cross-institutional links Continuous. Range: 0-1 
Spatial extent of villages 0: one village is involved; 
1: multiple villages are involved but all are situated within one sub-
district 
2: multiple villages are involved and are situated over multiple sub-
districts 
Size of resource system 0: 1-10 hectares 
1: 11-100 hectares 
2: greater than 100 hectares 
Terrain of resource system 1: considerable dry-field farming exists 
0: otherwise 
Topographic location of villages Continuous. Range: 0.05-0.61 
 
We used a model selection approach (Johnson and Omland 2004) to determine which sets of 
combinations of factors better explain cooperative transformation. We applied the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) method to compare the fits of all possible combinations of explanatory variables 
(Burnham and Anderson 2002). AIC is calculated for a suite of models and the best-fitting model has the 
smallest AIC. The absolute size of the AIC is unimportant; instead the difference in AIC values between 
the best fitting model and the others models ( i) indicates the relative support for the models. In order to 
compare models, we calculate Akaike weights (w) as the probability that a model would be selected as 
the best fitting model if the data were collected again under identical circumstances (Burnham and 




Where wi is the Akaike weights for model i; i is the different between the AIC of the 
best fitting model and that of model i. The numerator is the relative likelihood of the 
model i. The denominator calculates the sum of the relative likelihoods for all candidate 
models.  
 
For the set of models, Akaike weights sum to 1. A model whose Akaike weight is close to 1 is 
unambiguously supported by the data (Burnham and Anderson 2002). We consider as plausible models 
those with Akaike weights that are within 10% of the highest weight. We also calculated the relative 
variable importance as the sum of Akaike weights over all models including the explanatory variable. 
The relative variable importance is the probability that, of the variables considered, a certain variable is 
in the best approximating model. We calculated the model averaged estimates weighted by its Akaike 
weight (Burnham and Anderson 2002). Model-averaged parameter estimates are only calculated for 
those independent variables that are included in the confidence set of models.  
 
All analyses were conducted using the R Project (R Development Core Team, 2008) for Statistical 
Computing package, particularly applying the package MuMln (Bartón 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
